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@@ -32,27 +32,22 @@ We denoted by $\PROVE^{(j)}(r)$ or $\APPEND^{(j)}(r)$ the operation $\PROVE(r)$
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\subsubsection{t-BFT-DL}
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We consider a t-Byzantine Fault Tolerant DenyList (t-$\BFTDL$) with the following properties.
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There are 3 operations : $\PROVE(x), \APPEND(x), \READ(x)$ such that :
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There are 3 operations : $\BFTPROVE(x), \BFTAPPEND(x), \BFTREAD(x)$ such that :
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\paragraph{Termination.} Every operation $\APPEND(x)$, $\PROVE(x)$, and $\READ()$ invoked by a correct process always returns.
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\paragraph{Termination.} Every operation $\BFTAPPEND(x)$, $\BFTPROVE(x)$, and $\BFTREAD()$ invoked by a correct process always returns.
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\paragraph{APPEND Validity.} The invocation of $\APPEND(x)$ by a process $p$ is valid if:
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\paragraph{APPEND Validity.} The invocation of $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ by a correct process $p_i$ is valid iff $i \in \Pi_M$. Otherwise the operation is invalid.
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\paragraph{PROVE Validity.} If the invocation of a $op = \BFTPROVE(x)$ by a correct process $p$ is not valid, then:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item $p \in \Pi_M \subseteq \Pi$; \textbf{and}
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\item $x \in S$, where $S$ is a predefined set.
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\end{itemize}
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Otherwise, the operation is invalid.
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\paragraph{PROVE Validity.} If the invocation of a $op = \PROVE(x)$ by a correct process $p$ is not valid, then:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item $p \not\in \Pi_V \subseteq \Pi$; \textbf{or}
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\item At least $t+1$ valid $\APPEND(x)$ appears before $op$ in $\Seq$.
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\item $p \not\in \Pi_V$; \textbf{or}
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\item At least $t+1$ valid $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ appears before $op$ in $\Seq$.
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\end{itemize}
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Otherwise, the operation is valid.
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\paragraph{PROVE Anti-Flickering.} If the invocation of a operation $op = \PROVE(x)$ by a correct process $p \in \Pi_V$ is invalid, then any $\PROVE(x)$ operation that appears after $op$ in $\Seq$ is invalid.
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\paragraph{PROVE Anti-Flickering.} If the invocation of a operation $op = \BFTPROVE(x)$ by a correct process $p \in \Pi_V$ is invalid, then any $\BFTPROVE(x)$ operation that appears after $op$ in $\Seq$ is invalid.
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\paragraph{READ Validity.} The invocation of $op = \READ()$ by a process $p$ returns the list of valid invocations of $\PROVE$ that appears before $op$ in $\Seq$ along with the names of the processes that invoked each operation.
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\paragraph{READ Validity.} The invocation of $op = \BFTREAD()$ by a process $p$ returns the list of valid invocations of $\BFTPROVE$ that appears before $op$ in $\Seq$ along with the names of the processes that invoked each operation.
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\subsubsection{t-BFT-GE}
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@@ -68,6 +63,188 @@ There are three operations: $\BFTVOTE(j, r)$, $\BFTCOMMIT(r)$, and $\BFTRESULT(r
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\paragraph{Election.} If at least $f+1$ correct processes invoked a valid $\BFTVOTE(j, r)$ for the same process $j$ then $j$ will be enventually included in the set $W_r$ returned by $\BFTRESULT(r)$.
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\subsection{DL $\Rightarrow$ t-BFT-DL}
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\begin{lemma}
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For any fixed value $t < |M|$, multiple DenyList Object can be used to implement a t-Byzantine Fault Tolerant DenyList Object.
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\end{lemma}
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\begin{proof}
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Fix $t < |M|$. Let
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\[
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\mathcal{T} \triangleq \{\, T \subseteq M \mid |T| = t \,\}.
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\]
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For each $T \in \mathcal{T}$, we instantiate one DenyList object $DL_T$ whose authorization sets are
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\[
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\Pi_M(DL_T) \triangleq S_T \triangleq M \setminus T
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\qquad\text{and}\qquad
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\Pi_V(DL_T) \triangleq V.
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\]
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Let
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\[
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K \triangleq \{\, DL_T \mid T \in \mathcal{T} \,\},
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\qquad\text{so that}\qquad
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|K| = \binom{|M|}{t}.
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\]
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% The system consists of a set of $\Pi$ processes, we define a subset of processes $M \subseteq \Pi$ which are authorized to invoke the $\BFTAPPEND$ operation and a subset of processes $V \subseteq \Pi$ which are authorized to invoke the $\BFTPROVE$ operation.
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% There exist $K$ a set of $\binom{|M|}{t+1}$ DenyList objects denoted by $DL_1, DL_2, \dots, DL_{|K|}$ such that each DenyList $DL_k$ is associated with a unique subset of processes $S_k \subseteq M$ of size $t+1$.
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\begin{algorithmic}
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\State $K \gets \{DL_1, DL_2, \dots, DL_{|K|}\}$ \Comment{Set of DenyList objects}
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTAPPEND}{x}
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\If{$p_i \not\in \Pi_M$}
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\State \Return \textbf{false}
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\EndIf
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\For{\textbf{each } $DL_k \in K$ \textbf{such that} $p_i \in S_k$}
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\State $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$
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\EndFor
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\State \Return \textbf{true}
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTPROVE}{x}
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\For{\textbf{each } $DL_k \in K$}
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\State $state \gets DL_k.\PROVE(x) || state$
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\EndFor
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\State \Return $state$
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTREAD}{}
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\State $results \gets \emptyset$
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\For{\textbf{each } $DL_k \in K$}
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\State $res \gets DL_k.\READ()$
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\State $results \gets results \cup res$
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\EndFor
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\State \Return $results$
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\end{algorithmic}
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\textbf{APPEND Validity.} A process $p_i$ not in $\Pi_M$ who invokes $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ will never be able to submit a valid $\APPEND(x)$ to any DenyList $DL_k$ since each DenyList $DL_k$ is associated with a unique subset of processes $S_k \subseteq M$. Otherwise, if $p_i \in \Pi_M$, then any invocation of $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ are valid.
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\textbf{PROVE Validity.}
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Let set $op$ a particular invocation of $\BFTPROVE(x)$ by $p_i$.
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Case 1: If $p_i \not\in \Pi_V$, then $op$ is invalid since $p_i$ is not authorized to invoke $\PROVE$ operation in any DL.
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\item Case 2: If at least $t+1$ valid $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ submitted by $t+1$ distincts processus appears before $op$ in $\Seq$, then for any set $S_k$ there is at least one process in $S_k$ who submitted a valid $\APPEND(x)$ before $op$. Therefore, $op$ will be invalid since all $DLs$ will be locked on the value $x$ by the PROVE Validity of DL Object.
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\end{itemize}
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Otherwise $op$ is always valid.
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\textbf{PROVE Anti-Flickering.}
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Let $op=\BFTPROVE(x)$ be an invocation by a correct process $p_i \in \Pi_V$ that is \emph{invalid} in $\Seq$.
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By the \textbf{PROVE Validity} of t-$\BFTDL$, this implies that there exist at least $t+1$ \emph{valid}
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invocations of $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ by $t+1$ distinct processes that appear before $op$ in $\Seq$.
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Let $A \subseteq \Pi_M$ be the set of these (distinct) issuers, with $|A|\ge t+1$.
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Consider any DenyList object $DL_k \in K$, associated with a subset $S_k \subseteq M$ of size $|S_k|=t+1$.
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Since $K$ contains \emph{all} $(t+1)$-subsets of $M$ and $|A|\ge t+1$, we have
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\[
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S_k \cap A \neq \emptyset.
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\]
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Let $p_j \in S_k \cap A$. By construction of $\BFTAPPEND$, the invocation $\BFTAPPEND^{(j)}(x)$ triggers
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the operation $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ (because $p_j \in S_k$), and since $\BFTAPPEND^{(j)}(x) \prec op$ in $\Seq$,
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this $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ appears before the operation $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $op$ in the linearization $\Seq_k$
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of $DL_k$.
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Therefore, in $\Seq_k$ there exists a valid $\APPEND(x)$ before the invocation $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $op$.
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By the \textbf{PROVE Validity} property of $\DL$, this implies that the invocation $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $op$
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is \emph{invalid}. Since this holds for every $k \in K$, all component $\PROVE$ operations of $op$ are invalid.
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Now consider any invocation $op'=\BFTPROVE(x)$ that appears after $op$ in $\Seq$.
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For each $k$, the invocation of $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $op'$ appears after the one induced by $op$ in $\Seq_k$.
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By the \textbf{PROVE Anti-Flickering} property of $\DL$, once a $\PROVE(x)$ is invalid in $\Seq_k$,
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all subsequent $\PROVE(x)$ in $\Seq_k$ are invalid. Hence, for all $k$, the $\PROVE(x)$ induced by $op'$ is invalid,
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which implies that $op'$ is invalid at the t-$\BFTDL$ level.
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This proves the \textbf{PROVE Anti-Flickering} property for the construction.
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\medskip
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\textbf{READ Validity.}
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Let $op=\BFTREAD()$ be an invocation by a correct process $p$.
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The algorithm executes, for each $DL_k \in K$, a read $res_k \gets DL_k.\READ()$ and returns
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\[
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results \;=\; \bigcup_{k\in K} res_k.
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\]
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By \textbf{READ Validity} of each $\DL$, $res_k$ contains exactly the valid invocations of $\PROVE$
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that appear before $DL_k.\READ()$ in $\Seq_k$, together with the identities of their issuers.
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We show that $results$ is exactly the set of valid invocations of $\BFTPROVE$ that appear before $op$ in $\Seq$.
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\smallskip
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\emph{(i) Soundness (no false positives).}
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Take any entry $(j,\PROVE(x)) \in results$. Then $(j,\PROVE(x)) \in res_k$ for some $k$,
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hence the invocation $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ by $p_j$ is valid and appears before $DL_k.\READ()$ in $\Seq_k$.
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In particular, there is no valid $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ before that $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ in $\Seq_k$
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(otherwise $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ would be invalid by \textbf{PROVE Validity} of $\DL$).
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Assume by contradiction that the corresponding invocation $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ is invalid in $\Seq$.
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Then, by \textbf{PROVE Validity} of t-$\BFTDL$, there exist at least $t+1$ valid invocations of $\BFTAPPEND(x)$
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by $t+1$ distinct processes before $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ in $\Seq$.
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As in the argument used for \textbf{PROVE Anti-Flickering}, this implies that for every $DL_{k'} \in K$,
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there exists a valid $DL_{k'}.\APPEND(x)$ before the $DL_{k'}.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$.
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Therefore the induced $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ would be invalid, contradicting $(j,\PROVE(x)) \in res_k$.
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Hence $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ is valid and appears before $op$ in $\Seq$.
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\smallskip
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\emph{(ii) Completeness (no omissions).}
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Consider a valid invocation $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ that appears before $op=\BFTREAD()$ in $\Seq$.
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Let $A$ be the set of distinct processes that invoked a valid $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ before $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ in $\Seq$.
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Since $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$ is valid in t-$\BFTDL$, we have $|A| \le t$.
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Because $K$ contains all subsets $S_k \subseteq M$ of size $t+1$ and $t<|M|$,
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there exists some $S_k$ such that
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\[
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S_k \cap A = \emptyset.
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\]
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For this $DL_k$, none of the $\BFTAPPEND(x)$ invocations issued by processes in $A$
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triggers $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ (since $\BFTAPPEND$ calls $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ only for $k$ with issuer in $S_k$).
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Thus, there is no valid $DL_k.\APPEND(x)$ before the invocation $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ induced by $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x)$.
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By \textbf{PROVE Validity} of $\DL$, the induced $DL_k.\PROVE(x)$ is valid.
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Moreover, since $\BFTPROVE^{(j)}(x) \prec \BFTREAD()$ in $\Seq$, this induced $\PROVE(x)$ appears before
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$DL_k.\READ()$ in $\Seq_k$, and therefore it is included in $res_k$.
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Hence $(j,\PROVE(x)) \in results$.
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Combining (i) and (ii), $results$ contains exactly the valid invocations of $\BFTPROVE$
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that appear before $op$ in $\Seq$, together with the identities of their issuers.
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This proves the \textbf{READ Validity} property.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{t-BFT-DL $\Rightarrow$ t-BFT-GE}
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\begin{lemma}
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For any fixed value $r \in S$, multiple BFT-DenyList Object can be used to implement a BFT-Group Election Object.
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\end{lemma}
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\begin{proof}
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\begin{algorithmic}
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\State $Y[i]$ \Comment{Is a set of $n$ $\BFTDL$ with $\Pi_M = \Pi_V = \Pi$}
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTVOTE}{j, r}
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTCOMMIT}{r}
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{BFTRESULT}{r}
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\State $Z \gets \emptyset$
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\For{\textbf{each } $j \in \Pi$}
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\If{$|\{(\_, \PROVEtrace(\_, r)) \in Y[j].\BFTREAD(r)\}| \geq n-f$}
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\State $P \gets \BFTREAD()$
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\State \Return $\{j : (j, \PROVEtrace), \}$
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\EndIf
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\EndFor
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Algorithm}
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@@ -78,29 +255,73 @@ Each process $p_i$ maintains the following local variables:
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\State $\received \gets \emptyset$
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\State $\delivered \gets \emptyset$
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\State $\prop[r][j] \gets \bot, \forall r, j$
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\State $X_r \gets \bot, \forall r$
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% \State $X_r \gets \bot, \forall r$
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\State $W_r \gets \bot, \forall r$
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\State $\resolved[r] \gets \bot, \forall r$
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\end{algorithmic}
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\renewcommand{\algletter}{A}
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\begin{algorithm}[H]
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\caption{ABbroadcast$(m)$}
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\caption{ABroadcast$(m)$}
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\State $r \gets \current$
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\For{\textbf{each}\ $r \in \{\current, \current +1, \dots\}$}
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\State $\RBcast(i, PROP, m, r)$
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\State \textbf{wait} until $|W_r| \geq n - f$ where $W_r = \BFTRESULT[r]$
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\State $\BFTCOMMIT(r)$
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\State \textbf{wait} until $|\resolved[r]| \geq n - f$
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\State $W \gets \BFTRESULT[r]$
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\If{$i \in W_r \vee (\exists j, r': j \in W_r \wedge \prop[r'][j] \ni m)$}
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\State \textbf{break}
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\EndIf
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\EndFor
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\Function{ABroadcast}{$m$}
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\State $r \gets \current$
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\State $S \gets (\received \cup \{m\}$)
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\For{\textbf{each}\ $r \in \{\current, \current +1, \dots\}$}
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\State $\RBcast(i, PROP, S, r)$
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\State \textbf{wait} until $|W_r| \geq n - f$ where $W_r = \BFTRESULT[r]$
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\State $\BFTCOMMIT(r)$
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\State \textbf{wait} until $|\resolved[r]| \geq n - f$
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\State $W_r \gets \BFTRESULT[r]$
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\If{$i \in W_r \vee (\exists j, r': j \in W_r \wedge \prop[r'][j] \ni m)$}
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\State \textbf{break}
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\EndIf
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\EndFor
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\EndFunction
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{algorithm}
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\renewcommand{\algletter}{B}
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\begin{algorithm}[H]
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\caption{ADeliver$(m)$}
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\Function{ADeliver}{m}
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\State $r \gets \current$
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\If{$|\resolved[r]| < n - f$}
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\State \Return $\bot$
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\EndIf
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\State $W_r \gets \BFTRESULT[r]$
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\If{$\exists j \in W_r,\ \prop[r][j] = \bot$}
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\State \Return $\bot$
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\EndIf
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\State $M_r \gets \bigcup_{j \in W_r} \prop[r][j]$
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\State $m \gets \ordered(M_r \setminus \delivered)[0]$ \Comment{Set $m$ as the smaller message not already delivered}
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\State $\delivered \leftarrow \delivered \cup \{m\}$
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\If{$M_r \setminus \delivered = \emptyset$} \Comment{Check if all messages from round $r$ have been delivered}
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\State $\current \leftarrow \current + 1$
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\EndIf
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\State \textbf{return} $m$
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\EndFunction
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{algorithm}
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\renewcommand{\algletter}{C}
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\begin{algorithm}[H]
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\caption{RB handlers}
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\Function{Rreceived}{j, PROP, S, r}
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\State $\received \gets \received \cup \{S\}$
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\State $\prop[r][j] \gets S$
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\State $\BFTVOTE(j, r)$
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\EndFunction
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\vspace{1em}
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\Function{Rreceived}{j, COMMIT, r}
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\State $\received[r] \cup \{j\}$
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\EndFunction
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{algorithm}
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% \subsection{Example execution}
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Binary file not shown.
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@
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\newcommand{\PROVE}{\textsf{PROVE}}
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\newcommand{\PROVEtrace}{\textsf{prove}}
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\newcommand{\READ}{\textsf{READ}}
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\newcommand{\BFTAPPEND}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}APPEND}}
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\newcommand{\BFTPROVE}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}PROVE}}
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\newcommand{\BFTREAD}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}READ}}
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\newcommand{\ABbroadcast}{\textsf{AB-broadcast}}
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\newcommand{\ABdeliver}{\textsf{AB-deliver}}
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\newcommand{\RBcast}{\textsf{RB-cast}}
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@@ -59,9 +65,9 @@
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\newcommand{\Messages}{\mathsf{Messages}}
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\newcommand{\ABlisten}{\textsf{AB-listen}}
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\newcommand{\CANDIDATE}{\mathsf{CANDIDATE}}
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\newcommand{\CLOSE}{\mathsf{CLOSE}}
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\newcommand{\READGE}{\mathsf{READGE}}
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\newcommand{\CANDIDATE}{\textsf{VOTE}}
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\newcommand{\CLOSE}{\textsf{COMMIT}}
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\newcommand{\READGE}{\textsf{RESULT}}
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\newcommand{\SHARE}{\mathsf{SHARE}}
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\newcommand{\COMBINE}{\mathsf{COMBINE}}
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@@ -78,12 +84,12 @@
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\newcommand{\Seq}{\mathsf{Seq}}
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\newcommand{\GE}{\mathsf{GE}}
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\newcommand{\BFTDL}{\mathsf{BFT\text{-}DL}}
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\newcommand{\BFTDL}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}DL}}
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\newcommand{\BFTGE}{\mathsf{BFT\text{-}GE}}
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\newcommand{\BFTVOTE}{\mathsf{BFT\text{-}VOTE}}
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\newcommand{\BFTCOMMIT}{\mathsf{BFT\text{-}COMMIT}}
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\newcommand{\BFTRESULT}{\mathsf{BFT\text{-}RESULT}}
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\newcommand{\BFTGE}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}GE}}
|
||||
\newcommand{\BFTVOTE}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}VOTE}}
|
||||
\newcommand{\BFTCOMMIT}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}COMMIT}}
|
||||
\newcommand{\BFTRESULT}{\textsf{BFT\text{-}RESULT}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\crefname{theorem}{Theorem}{Theorems}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user